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Abstract. The deployment of security measures can lead in many oc-
casions to an infringement of users’ privacy. Indeed, nowadays we have
many examples about surveillance programs or personal data breaches
in online service providers. In order to avoid the latter problem, we need
to establish security measures that do not involve a violation of privacy
rights. In this communication we discuss the main challenges when con-
ciliating information security and users’ privacy.
1 Introduction
Along the second half of the twentieth century there was a technological rev-
olution that has led to the so-called information era. Information technologies
have evolved from having a marginal position to being a cornerstone of today’s
economical activities. Certainly, in these days it is almost impossible to conceive
the daily work without the usage of technological means related to information
management.
This capital prominence of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)
is consequently endorsed by the digital agenda of the national and transnational
organisations. For example, in the digital agenda of the European Union it is un-
derlined that economical progress is currently built upon the proper concretion
and management of ICT [1]. In fact, the health of modern democracy is heavily
dependent on the application of ICT to enlarge and ensure governability. The
result of such an effort is oriented to what it is coined as e-democracy [26], which
cannot be attained unless users trust and use ICT appropriately and respectfully.
According to the cybersecurity strategy of the European Commission [1], it is
demanded a supra-national effort to reinterpret the laws in physical world in the
new coordinates of the digital world. The main goal is on shaping Internet as a
democratic agora for sharing and discussing information on the grounds of free
speech, data confidentiality and users’ privacy protection. This complex objective
can be only achieved by creating and using adequate access and authorisation
rules and, of course, by applying robust and efficient security measures.
On this point, we have to take into account that the performance of security
procedures and methods should not imply an erosion of citizens’ rights. As it
is pointed out by Hanni M. Fakhour (staff attorney of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation), any control measure and/or security procedure should not pose
a threat to fundamental citizen rights such as confidentiality and privacy [17].
Furthermore, the implementation of technological and normative regulations is
not an exclusive responsibility of government institutions and private enterprises:
citizens are required to use ICT in a responsible way, and thus we have to
be aware that most cyber attacks are enabled by the information trace that
we leave in the Internet. Indeed, our visits to online social networks [34] and
our continuous search for information drop an almost indelible fingerprint of
ourselves [25].
In this paper we present a study of the most significant aspects of privacy
protection when using cryptographic tools. The concept of privacy is far from
being easily captured by a closed definition. In this communication, we have in-
terpreted privacy with respect to the expected requirements in security systems.
Thus, we have focused our study in mechanisms to preserve privacy through
confidentiality protection (privacy as confidentiality), by means of convenient
access control services (privacy as control), and on the grounds of easy-to-use
solutions (privacy as practice). Accordingly, we have distinguished six challenges
that should be faced to accomplish a fully integration of the previous highlighted
domains.
2 Challenge 1: privacy enhanced secure data provenance
Data provenance is required to further protect information systems, since infor-
mation assets cannot be protected just by assuming that confidentiality, integrity
and availability are guaranteed. Certainly, in modern Information Security Man-
agement Systems (ISMS) it is not a good option to take for granted any expected
behaviour from our systems. It is necessary to design and establish proper de-
fences against information assets such as confidentiality, integrity and availabil-
ity. After that, a continuous evaluation process is needed in order to confirm
the likelihood of our protection measures and the suitability of the authentica-
tion and authorisation protocols. For such an examination underlying logging
systems must be developed for capturing the different events that appear when
using our ICT network to access and manage our information assets. In other
words, auditability is another major concern in security engineering.
A critical step when creating audit trails consists in deciding the events to
capture and the information needed to characterise each event. This definition is
fundamental for intrusion detection, and thus the audit logs should be properly
protected [32]. Here we have to consider both efficiency and privacy compliance
as the current challenges with respect to data provenance in the scope of auditing.
Regarding efficiency, we should bear in mind that the main operation to perform
on audit trails is derived from information search processes. If we are dealing
with encrypted files, it implies that we need to decrypt all logs in order to
look for events. While this could be a bottleneck, in practice we can solve it
by using searchable encrypted logs [4]. Furthermore, since the main concern
when encrypting logs is to avoid the threat of non-trusted storage servers and
the application of anti-forensics techniques, we could use peer-to-peer (P2P)
schemes to create split trust domains in order to reduce the effect of malicious
individual storage servers [33].
As for privacy-respectful audits, we should consider that anonymisation and
proper event coding are not an option but a requirement [7]. In specific, secure
data provenance relies on four elements: access control, privacy, integrity, and
accountability. As it occurs with the protection of audit logs, conventional en-
cryption and authentication procedures are not the best solution. Aligned with
the claim presented in [7], we should adopt solutions coming from the field of
the Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET). This being the case, the challenge
of secure data provenance should be tackled by considering homomorphic en-
cryption [18], secure multi party computation [12], multi signatures [8], group
signatures [10], ring signatures [11], etc.
3 Challenge 2: client-side encryption
The emergence of cloud computing is one of the most relevant novelties in the
technological scenario in the last five years. It entails a low cost opportunity
to share and store data, which is specially important for Small and Medium
Enterprises (SMEs). Actually, platforms such as Dropbox or Google Drive make
possible to backup our information assets for free. Nevertheless, we have to take
into account that the final storage servers cannot be assumed to be fully trusted.
Certainly, in most situations the adoption of a cloud computing solution im-
plies some form of data outsourcing, so there is not a clear guarantee about the
way our data are going to be treated and protected. This is the main reason
behind the design of new procedures enabling an active role for the client of
cloud computing services. These initiatives are intended to create software prod-
ucts to provide users with the proper encryption tools, so each item of data is
encrypted before it is sent to the cloud [20]. As an important effort in client-side
encryption, we have to pinpoint all the contributions to solve the main security
problems (due to some form of code injection) in web applications [31]. In ad-
dition, we can find several meaningful proposals handling the shortcomings of
homomorphic encryption to create privacy-respectful web platforms [27].
4 Challenge 3: client-side integrity verification
Client-side encryption is not the only means to manage zero trust models in
cloud computing [37]. Indeed, data fragmentation is another important issue
that should be considered when pondering the pros and cons of outsourcing
data storage. The main problem with data fragmentation is that we need to
have several copies of each data fragment (otherwise we cannot recover the orig-
inal information), and an exhaustive protocol for data integrity verification is
also demanded in order to guarantee data coherence and consistence. Integrity
verification is a commitment in all the different schemes of cloud computing
where we do not have a complete trust in the service provider [23]. Moreover,
if digital signatures are used to carry out integrity validation, then schemes as
group signatures could be integrated into our system to protect users’ anonymity
[9].
5 Challenge 4: anonymity management
Being privacy one of the basic rights in current societies, different approaches
have been suggested in order to guarantee it. Anonymity is certainly one of
the fundamental alternatives: if the identities of the parties inside a system are
not known, it is harder to violate their privacy. However, as it happens with all
privacy-respectful techniques, it may be misused for illegitimate purposes, giving
institutions and governments a reason to ban it1. Accordingly, it would probably
also make it harder for companies (who, as stated in [13] also possess private
information of value to governments) to decline government requests and, of
course, to trust anonymising systems. As matter of fact, this risk has not gone
unnoticed to systems providing anonymity2.
One logical way to address this issue is to incorporate mechanisms that allow
the detection and sanction of illegitimate anonymous actions. However, for this
to be possible, anonymity management must be somehow included. Efforts in
this direction have already been made, which allow to create X.509 anonymous
identities based on group signatures [6,10] and subsequently manage and revoke
them if necessary [16]. Moreover, specific applications have been proposed for
systems such as Tor [15], but also as an additional layer for these anonymising
networks [21,22,35,36]. However, this is a concern that needs to be carefully dealt
with, since a significant reduction in anonymity would certainly be rejected by
the users of anonymous communication systems.
6 Challenge 5: digital content life-cycle management
The definition and implementation of Digital Rights Management (DRM) sys-
tems is one of the most difficult tasks in the current technological scenario. Al-
though DRM is usually assumed to be just a mechanism to protect intellectual
1 A recent example of privacy enhancing technologies being questioned by a govern-
ment is that of Cameron in the UK who, after the attack on Charlie Hebdo in Paris,
stated: “are we going to allow a means of communications where it simply is not
possible to do that [listen in on communications]?” http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/jan/15/david-cameron-encryption-anti-terror-laws.
2 See, for instance, the call made by Tor: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/call-
arms-helping-internet-services-accept-anonymous-users.
property, it also provides privacy protection as a result of avoiding information
leakage in assets with Personal Identifiable Information (PII) [2]. DRM systems
can (and, in some cases, should) be extended considering P2P privacy-respectful
platforms [29] and Private Information Retrieval protocols (PIR) [3].
7 Challenge 6: usable identity management systems
The claim for assuming the security-by-design and privacy-by-design paradigms
is a recurrent chant in recent contributions in cryptography engineering [19].
In this regard, standards and well-known technologies are a basic set to design
new security systems, since they are continuous and carefully evaluated by the
information security community. This initial selection of technologies should be
further complemented with a explicit definition of security assumptions and a
correct analysis and validation of the underlying security protocols [14].
However, the success of a security solution is not possible without the accep-
tance of end users. On this point, we have to bear in mind that the low users’
acceptance of encryption [38] is even worse when considering the broader spec-
trum of PET [30]. Therefore, it is highly advisable to acknowledge and learn
from recent contributions on creating usable authentication procedures [24] and
enforcing privacy settings online [5]. In fact, this last concern is of paramount
importance in online services, since the related providers collect and manage
PII whereas the user generally has only partial knowledge about the proper and
legitimate use of his or her data [28].
8 Conclusion
In this contribution we have summarised the main open problems in the crossed
domain of security and privacy, providing an sketch of the most critical chal-
lenges in that field. We have provided a list of the limitations in current systems
implementations, and we have also discussed some possible ways to solve those
shortcomings.
As the main lesson of our study, we can conclude that an adequate collabora-
tion between the cryptology community and the security engineering collective is
necessary. There are plenty of theoretical solutions to handle the problems that
we have underlined in this paper. However, in many occasions those theoretical
solutions are difficult to implement and tend to incur in excesive computational
costs.
Regarding this issue, software engineers could help to adapt theoretical propos-
als to already deployed infrastructures, taking into account the usability of the
final products as a mandatory requisite. Moreover, this help should be built upon
a thorough examination of each step of the design, implementation and main-
tenance phases of the corresponding software products. In this regard, software
engineers could call for assistance from formal system analysts and information
theory experts in order to better study and characterise data breaches.
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